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Given the move toward driverless cars, which includes the more short-term goal of driving assistance, what the 
appropriate shared authority and interaction paradigms should be between human drivers and the automation remains 
an open question until more principled research and testing has occurred. It is unclear at this time how robust driverless 
cars are to system failures (including human failures) and operations in degraded sensor environments. Automation 
onboard such vehicles is inherently brittle and can only account for what it is programmed to consider. Communication 
between what is technically a very complex system to a human population of extreme variability in driving skills and 
attention management will be difficult, since the driver will need to be appropriately informed of the state of the system, 
including limitations, and will need to build appropriate trust in the automation’s capabilities (neither too much or too 
little). Further complicating this problem is the significant body of research demonstrating that automated systems can 
lead to boredom, which encourages distraction. This leaves operators unaware of the state of the vehicle (aka, mode 
confusion) and ill-suited to respond quickly and appropriately in case of a potential accident. Over time, operator skill 
degradation due to automation use can further reduce the human ability to respond to emergent driving demands, and 
will likely lead to risk homeostasis even in normal operations. Each of these issues are well-known to the human 
systems engineering community, but it is unclear that these issues are being considered by driverless car designers or 
that manufactures are conducting human-in-the-loop tests with representative members of the driving population. Until 
these tests show that the vehicles account for the aforementioned issues, driverless cars will not be safe for 
unrestricted access and use on U.S. roadways. Moreover, there are significant socio-technical considerations that do 
not appear to be a concern in the push to introduce this technology on a wide scale. The utilitarian approach quoted by 
many in the press, i.e., that driverless cars will eventually kill people but that this should be acceptable due to the likely 
reduction in overall deaths (which is not yet proven) demonstrates an insensitivity to a deontological perspective that 
causes many people to be uncomfortable with such a significant shift in responsibility and accountability to computers. 
Driverless is Really Driver-Optional 
Google, Volvo, GM, Audi, Toyota and other companies designing and testing driverless” cars claim that they are 
capable of navigating roadways, changing lanes, observing traffic signals, and avoiding pedestrians without human 
input. They do so through a combination of technologies including GPS position information, internal navigation maps, 
outward-facing cameras, and the use of laser (and other) range-finding systems. The first two of these technologies 
allow the vehicle to understand where it is in the world where it should be going, and how to get there; the latter two 
allow the vehicle to track where it is on the road and where other vehicles, traffic indicators, and pedestrians are. 
 
While termed “driverless,” the vehicles are better classified as driver-optional, particularly under NHTSA Levels 2 and 3 
of automated driving, where human operators are expected to have either primary or secondary control responsibilities. 
Although such vehicles are supposedly capable of driving through any traffic situation without requiring a human driver 
to apply pressure to the pedals, shifting, or steering, this driver may still choose to do so and may play a role in avoiding 
accidents. Google readily admits that, while testing, there remains a safety driver and a software operator in the vehicle 
at all times in the case of near accidents or software failures (Thrun 2010).  
 
While ultimately in the distant future, this driver won’t be needed, these systems currently require a human to be in the 
driver’s seat and allow (and in some cases, expect) the driver to assume control at specific points in time. It is here that 
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the problem lies: as long as a human operator has some expectation of shared authority, either primary or secondary, 
the design of the automation must be such that the operator fully understands the capabilities and limitations of the 
vehicle and maintains full awareness of what the system is doing. Failure to do so may lead to a variety of accidents, 
both automation and human-induced. 
 
While Google’s driverless cars have already logged over 300,000 miles (Urmson 2012), two accidents have occurred. 
One of these occurred while the car was traveling on roads not previously mapped into its system (DeBolt 2011). This 
is evidence of automation brittleness in that the car was not able to handle the uncertainty in its internal model, 
exacerbated by human error (CBS News 2011). Such problems are further exacerbated by an inherent human 
limitation known as neuromuscular lag (Jagacinski and Flach 2003), where even if a person is paying attention 
perfectly, there is still an approximate half second lag for a person to see a developing situation and then take action 
accordingly. Instances of “human error” like this are not the fault of the human alone; it is instead a fault of the 
interaction between the human and the automation and their respective weakness of imperfect attention and response 
execution (for the human) and brittleness in perception and solution generation (automation.) 
 
 
Lessons from the Aviation Community 
 
The driverless car community can look to aviation for many lessons learned from the introduction of automation to 
relieve pilot workload and in theory, improve safety. Many accidents labeled as human error by the FAA and the NTSB 
are better categorized as failures of human-automation interaction (Dismukes, Berman et al. 2007). 
• The 1972 crash of Eastern Airlines flight 401 was caused by a faulty oil warning light that appeared on final 
approach. The crew, distracted by the disagreement between the warning light and other gauges, failed to 
notice that the autopilot disengaged, with no warning to the pilots. They slowly descended into the Everglades. 
• Air France 447, which crashed off the coast of Brazil in 2009, involved two failures: Failure of the automation, 
and a failure to present information to the operator. A clogged pressure sensor lead the autopilot system to 
sense the airplane was too low in altitude. The autopilot then put the aircraft into an increasing high climb, 
eventually triggering the stall warning alert. With the aircraft on autopilot, the pilot allowed himself to become 
distracted. When the stall warning activated, the pilot was not aware of what was happening and made the 
worst of all possible decisions – he attempted to further increase the aircraft’s climb angle, worsening the stall, 
and contributing to the crash. 
• Northwest Flight 188, which overshot Minneapolis, MN by roughly an hour in the fall of 2009, was caused by 
operator boredom and resultant distraction. With the aircraft autopilot in control, both pilots became distracted 
by their conversation and failed to monitor the aircraft and its status. As they opened their laptops to obtain 
information to supplement their conversation, they misdialed a radio frequency change, missed at least one 
text message sent by air traffic control to find out where they were, and only realized what was occurring when 
queried by a flight attendant on the landing time. Luckily, this only resulted in a late landing, but more severe 
consequences could easily have occurred. 
 
These issues are common to many other domains involving human interaction with automation systems and are well 
known to the human factors and experimental psychology communities. In general, the research community agrees 
that human attention is a limited resource to be allocated, and that the human brain requires some level of stimulus to 
keep its attention and performance high. Lacking this input, they seek it elsewhere, leaving them susceptible to 
distraction either by external stimuli or by the wrong information. This means that operators may miss important cues 
from the automation or from the environment (Eastern Flight 401), or may see the cues but may not have all the 
appropriate information required to make a correct decision (Air France 447), or use their spare capacity to engage in 
distracting activities leading to a loss in situational awareness (Northwest 188). They might also enter a state of “mode 
confusion,” where the operator makes decisions believing that the system is in a different state than it currently is 
(Lankenau 2002).  
 
While the earlier examples and research come from the aviation domain, the role of a pilot monitoring an aircraft 
autopilot system differs little from the “driver” of a driverless car. Recently, research in human-automation interaction 
has expanded to automated driving systems and are showing the same effects (Rudin-Brown and Parker 2004, Saxby, 
Matthews et al. 2007, Young and Stanton 2007, Vollrath, Schleicher et al. 2011, Neubauer, Matthews et al. 2012, 
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Jamson, Merat et al. 2013). Drivers that were placed in an autonomous or highly automated car were less attentive to 
the car while the automation was active, more prone to distractions (especially using their cellular phone), slower to 
recognize critical issues, and slower to react to emergency situations (such as emergency braking). There were 
benefits from using automated systems with lower average speeds and better separation between vehicles during their 
tests, but these came at the cost of poorer performance in emergency situations. In other words, at precisely the time 
when the automation needs assistance, the operator could not provide it and may actually have made the situation 
worse. We cannot assume the operator to be always engaged, always informed, and always ready to intervene and 
make correct decisions when required by the automation or the situation do so. This goes for highly-trained pilots of 
commercial airliners as well as the general driving population of the United States and other countries (who receive 
little to no formal training and assessment).  
Technology Robustness  
Because much of the development of driverless cars is proprietary, we do not know their exact capabilities at this 
time. As such, we cannot make definitive statements about a specific vehicle and can only comment on the 
limitations of the technology overall and outline specific questions of concern. As best we understand, Google’s 
autonomous car relies on four major technologies in its autonomous operations: LIDAR (Light Detection and 
Ranging), a set of onboard cameras, GPS, and stored maps in the vehicle’s onboard computer. The GPS signal 
tells the car where it is on the stored map and where its final destination is, and from this, the car determines its 
route. Cameras and LIDAR help the vehicle sense where it is on the road, where other vehicles are, and where to 
find and follow stop signs and streetlights.  
 
Each of these systems is vulnerable in some form or fashion and it is not clear whether any redundancy exists, or 
if any one of the four systems fails (maps, GPS, cameras, LIDAR), the car will not be able to function correctly. If 
the GPS or maps fail, the car does not know where it is on its route and where it should be going. If the LIDAR 
fails, it may not be able to detect other nearby cars, pedestrians, etc. If the cameras fail, it may not be able to 
recognize a stop sign or the current color of the traffic light. In addition, it is not clear how much advanced 
mapping is required by driverless cars and the frequency of map updates that are required to maintain an 
effective 3D world model by which the onboard computer makes decisions. 
 
The security of GPS has also been questioned (Volpe National Transportation Systems Center 2001, Humphreys, 
Ledvina et al. 2008). GPS “spoofing” (mimicking the GPS signal to provide false location information) and 
jamming (forcibly denying GPS signal) attacks have already been observed in US military operations (Franceschi-
Bicchiera 2012, Waterman 2012) as well as in civilian applications (Marks 2012). It would not be far-fetched to 
imagine an individual or group of individuals spoofing GPS signals in major metropolitan areas during rush hour 
and forcing cars off the road into buildings, off bridges, or otherwise causing damage.  
 
Google’s own researchers admit that inclement weather and construction areas are something they have yet to master 
(Urmson 2012). Precipitation, fog, and dust are known problems for LIDAR sensors, which can interfere with the image 
detection capabilities of the camera and can scatter or block the laser beams sent out by the LIDAR. Cameras are also 
sensitive to such problems. This leaves the vehicle unable to sense the distance to other cars and unable to recognize 
stop signs, traffic lights, and pedestrians. Urmson also notes that the technology cannot currently handle construction 
signs, traffic cops (which requires sophisticated gesture recognition that is still an immature technology), and other non-
normal driving conditions. A related question is how well the system can anticipate the actions of other drivers; it is one 
thing to be able to avoid a car calmly changing lanes, and another entirely to anticipate the actions of a reckless and 
irrational driver. Given that prior research has shown that people are prone to distraction, any failures or degradations in 
the technology will significantly increase the likelihood of a serious or fatal accident. 
Effects over Time: Trust and Skill Degradation 
How drivers adapt to the presence and performance of the automation over time is not a trivial issue. If the automation 
is perceived to be unreliable or not proficient, then the operator refuses to use the system, regardless of any potential 
benefits (Parasuraman and Riley 1997). However, when automation is perceived to be proficient, operators rely more 
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heavily on the technology and fail to utilize their own skills (Parasuraman, Sheridan et al. 2000). This leads to a loss of 
skill and further increases reliance on the automation (Lee and Moray 1994), possibly leading back to issues with mode 
confusion as previously discussed. Skill degradation due to over reliance on automation is such a problem in aviation 
that the FAA recently released a safety notice recommending that pilots fly more in manual mode than using the 
autopilot (Federal Aviation Administration 2013). Another possible concern with increasing automation is the concept of 
risk homeostasis (WIlde 1998) where drivers could begin to accept more risk as they perceive the automation to be 
more capable, which could lead to increased distraction and reliance on the automated system. 
 
The effective prevention of these issues can be accomplished by providing appropriate feedback to the operator on 
their performance and the performance of the automation. This is often referred to as designing the system for 
“appropriate” trust (Lee and See 2004). The automation should be capable of describing its performance and its 
limitations to the driver, who should then be able to learn how best to use the automation in the course of their driving 
routine. The automation should also be able to sense when the human operator is performing poorly, or even 
dangerously, so that it can either support the driver or take over control. The end result is more of a partnership – each 
side understanding and accounting for the abilities and limitations of the other.  
Socio-technical Considerations 
A common argument in favor of inserting driverless car technology as soon as possible is that accidents and fatalities 
will be dramatically reduced, as expressed by Google’s Sebastian Thrun, “…more than 1.2 million lives are lost every 
year in road traffic accidents. We believe our technology has the potential to cut that number, perhaps by as much as 
half (Thrun 2010).”  While certainly a logical argument in keeping with rational decision-making theory, such a utilitarian 
approach is not universally shared. A deontological approach could assert that machines should not be allowed to take 
the lives of humans under any circumstances, which is similar to the three laws of Asimov.  
 
Even if the fatality rate is lower than that of human-operated vehicles (which is not a guarantee for autonomous cars, 
particularly for those at NHTSA levels 2/3), the idea of a machine killing a human, even accidentally, will likely not 
resonate with the general public. Indeed, there has been recent intense media and public campaigns against 
autonomous weaponized military robots (Human Rights Watch 2012). These issues will likely also be raised as 
significant concerns once driverless (and especially driver assisted) technology is either responsible for a fatality or a 
serious accident that receives intense media attention. Furthermore, the chain of legal responsibility for driverless or 
driver assistance technologies is not clear as well as what basic form of licensure should be required for operation. 
Manufacturers and regulatory agencies of driverless technologies bear the responsibility of not only considering the 
technological ramifications of this technology, but also the socio-technical aspects, which at this point, has not been 
satisfactorily addressed.  
Summary 
Driverless car technology is promising in terms of creating safer and more efficient driving systems, but many questions 
remain. As discussed, the robustness of the technology and the interaction between the human driver and driverless 
technology are unclear. Boredom and distraction, mode confusion, recovery from automation errors, skill degradation, 
and trust issues are all of major concern and have been observed in both experimental and real-life settings. However, 
there are solutions to these problems through proper design, supplemented by extensive testing to confirm that the 
solutions had the intended effect. 
 
At this time, manufacturers have not provided, to our knowledge, any documentation describing how they have 
addressed these issues in their designs, including extensive and independent principled testing. Adding to the problem 
is the fact that these issues lie outside the typical tests performed by NHTSA in assessing safety. Until such time as 
these issues have been addressed through independent human-in-the-loop testing with representative user 
populations, these vehicles should remain experimental. We encourage NHTSA to develop such a program in their role 
as a safety monitor of U.S. automobiles, as well as developing a program to test the reliability and robustness of the 
technologies (GPS, LIDAR, etc.) and requirements for driver training, continuing education and licensure associated 
with these vehicles.  
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The development of driverless car technologies is critical for the advancement of the transportation industry. However, 
the majority of promises and benefits of the driverless car will likely only be realized once all cars have such advanced 
technologies, and we achieve NHTSA’s Level 4 of fully autonomous driving. At this point in time, we are in a very 
tenuous period where we are attempting to transition new and unproven technologies into a complex sociotechnical 
system with significant variation in human ability. In addition, public perception is fast becoming a major obstacle but is 
surmountable. To this end, great care should be taken in the experimentation with and implementation of driverless 
technology as an ill-timed serious accident could have unanticipated public backlash, which could affect other robotic 
industries as well. 
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